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Abstract 
Our study analyzes the consequences of workers’ participation in the wage setting 
process on effort exertion. The experimental design is based on a modified gift-
exchange game where the degree of workers’ involvement in the wage setting process is 
systematically varied among the workers. The experimental data reveals that workers’ 
participation leads actually to a decline in effort exertion which can be explained by 
negative reciprocity of the respective worker. These results put some recently observed 
positive effects from workers’ participation in experimental labor markets into 
perspective and are more in line with the ambiguous results from empirical studies. 
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1. Introduction 
Formal and informal institutions of workers’ participation and co-determination in 
the management of firms are widespread and, in some countries like Germany, Belgium, 
and the Netherlands, even mandatory for large firms. Indeed, 60 per cent of workers in 
the European Union (excluding UK) are covered by collective bargaining agreements 
that are conducted by workers councils and/or trade unions with the respective firm or 
employer associations. One of the main arguments in favor of workers’ participation is 
that the involvement of workers in managerial decision processes fosters their 
identification with the firm’s objectives, which should finally result in increased labor 
performance and higher productivity. Empirical studies that try to explicitly validate this 
hypothesis, however, produce rather mixed results; see Addison et al. (2004) and 
Mueller (2011) for surveys of the respective literature. As most of these empirical 
studies are based on panel and cross-sectional data with different degrees of 
representativeness, they also face the typical problems of empirical work in contexts 
where the implementation of randomized treatments is not feasible, for instance, 
confounding effects from unobserved heterogeneity, or reverse causality.  
Recently, the experimental approach has been applied to avoid these shortcomings 
and to address the consequences of increased worker participation in controlled 
laboratory situations; see Mellizo et al. (2011) and Charness et al. (2012). In both 
studies, subjects in the worker role were assigned substantial influence in the decision 
making process about the relevant work compensation. While the first study used a real 
effort experiment where participants vote on the respective compensation scheme 
among a restricted set of potential options, the second study was based on the gift-
exchange game, which is the standard game in experimental labor economics; see Fehr 
el al. (1993 and 1998) and Charness (2004). The crucial design feature of Charness et al. 
(2012) was a delegation treatment, where the decision about wages was completely 
delegated to the respective workers. Total authority of the worker in setting her own 
wage in the gift-exchange game should thereby reflect the wage decision processes in 
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some highly successful enterprises like the Brazilian Semco SA whose organizational 
structures rather resemble labor co-operatives based on workers’ self-management. 
Although both studies differ in the experimental design, the observed incentive effects 
from workers’ participation in the managerial decision making process were very 
similar: Performance (in the sense of effort exertion) increased in the participation 
treatment, which even implied pareto-improvements in the Charness et al. (2012) 
framework. The latter finding, however, could not be confirmed outside the laboratory: 
Although Jeworrek and Mertins (2014) found in a natural field experiment that workers 
who were allowed to choose their own wage exerted significantly more effort than a 
control group, the performance increase was much smaller than the self-determined 
wage increase. 
Our study complements this literature by granting workers a more limited degree 
of participatory influence in the wage setting process. The fact that, in our experiment, 
workers do not have total autonomy in setting their wages, should reflect in a more 
appropriate way the type of co-determination that is actually observed in the real world, 
where institutions of collective bargaining based on union or worker delegates are 
common (in contrast to labor-owned firms or labor cooperatives). Hence, in our version 
of the gift-exchange game, we allow a representative worker to choose from a menu of 
two alternative labor contract options that are ex-ante specified by the employer. The 
main objective of our study is then to analyze the robustness of the previously observed 
performance-enhancing effects with respect to this limited (but also more natural) 
institution of workers’ involvement in an experimental framework.  
Our experimental design relies on a modified gift-exchange game where each firm 
is matched simultaneously with three workers, as in Gächter and Thöni (2010), 
Charness and Kuhn (2007), and Kocher et al. (2012). The distinctive design feature of 
our approach is that all workers matched to a specific firm face exactly the same 
contract which has been chosen ex-ante by one (the representative) of the workers. 
Contrary to previous multi-player gift-exchange games, we exclude the possibility of 
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‘horizontal’ comparisons among employees: Workers are not informed about co-
workers’ performance and payoff. Furthermore, employers are paid only one (out of 
three) work relations, thus the game is a standard bilateral gift-exchange game from a 
game-theoretic point of view. This also implies that payoff-relevant characteristics are 
identical for all three workers, which in turn allows us to identify the incentive effects of 
participation in the contract decision process without having confounding effects from 
potential differences in monetary payoffs. Hence, systematic differences in behavior 
between the three workers can be traced back to the respective treatment differences that 
only vary the degree of participation and the provided information on the details of the 
wage setting process. 
The analysis of our experimental data reveals that incentive effects of participation 
in the wage setting process are (surprisingly) rather negative: A worker who participates 
in the decision about the final work contract (the participation treatment) exerts on 
average significantly less effort than workers who neither participate in the wage setting 
process nor are informed about the details of the two alternative contract options (the 
control group). Hence, in our case there is no direct link between increased workers’ 
participation and improved firm performance. 
A more detailed analysis of behavioral reactions yields three additional 
observations of interest: Firstly, initially existing differences in effort exertion among 
the workers fade out in later rounds of the experiment. Secondly, differences in the 
degree of information with respect to the details of the contract alternatives do not affect 
effort exertion to a large extent. Thirdly, the wage-effort gradient (which measures the 
responsiveness of workers with respect to proposed wage offers by the firm) of workers 
in the participation treatment is higher than for workers who do not participate in the 
wage setting process. The last observation is important because it suggests that 
reciprocity plays a major role in explaining the aforementioned differences in behavior 
(in contrast to Charness et al. 2012). Moreover, it suggests that specifically negative 
reciprocity is an important driver for the comparatively low effort levels observed from 
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workers in the participation treatment, because those workers react more negatively to 
lower wage offers than other workers. We find evidence for both explanations in the 
regression analysis. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 the experimental design 
is explained. The experimental results are presented and discussed in Section 3, while 
Section 4 concludes. An Appendix contains additional material and the experimental 
instructions. 
 
2.  Experimental Design 
Our experimental design is based on a modified version of the standard bilateral 
gift-exchange game as it was introduced in the context of incomplete labor contracts 
by, for instance, Fehr et al. (1993 and 1998), Hannan et al. (2002), and Charness 
(2004). The novel element in our version is the variation of the contract setting 
procedures, which is discussed in detail in the subsequent paragraphs. Besides the 
contract setting stage, the underlying gift-exchange game follows the standard protocols 
as introduced in the aforementioned papers: A labor contract 𝑣 consists of a fixed wage 
𝑤 ∈ [20,120] (limited to integers) and a ‘desired’ effort level ?̂? ∈ [0.1,1] (limited to 
decimals), that are both specified by the respective firm. Effort ?̂? is called ‘desired’ 
because it is non-binding for the worker. In the second stage and after the final contract 
𝑣 = (𝑤, ?̂?) has been specified, workers can react to the final contract 𝑣 by exerting 
costly effort 𝑒 ∈ {0.1,1} (limited to decimals). The combination of wage and exerted 
effort determines outcomes and monetary payoffs for each pair of participants. Workers 
receive the fixed wage 𝑤, pay fixed costs of 20 and face a disutility of effort exertion 
according to the following cost function 𝑐(𝑒): 
 
Table 1: Cost of Effort 
Effort 𝑒: 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
Cost 𝑐(𝑒): 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
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Hence, the monetary payoff function of a worker is given by: 
𝜋𝐿 = w − c(e) − 20. 
Firms benefit from exerted effort of the workers but have to pay the fixed wage: 
𝜋𝐹 = (120 − 𝑤)e. 
 
These functional forms for workers and firms are standard and applied, for 
instance, in the seminal contributions of Fehr and Falk (1999), Fehr et al. (1998), and 
Charness (2004).1 Both payoff functions and the cost function are common knowledge 
for all participants.  
 
The Contract Setting Procedures 
Workers’ participation in managerial decision making is implemented through 
different procedures in the contract setting stage. Our objective is to vary the degree of 
workers’ participation (and thus their influence) on the finally implemented labor 
contract while keeping the material incentives identical among all workers that are 
matched to the same firm. This is achieved by the following set-up: Each firm faces 
simultaneously three workers of distinctive types A, B, and C. Firms are asked to 
specify two alternative work contracts: 𝑣1 = (𝑤1, ?̂?1) and 𝑣2 = (𝑤2, ?̂?2), where 𝑤1 ≠
𝑤2 and ?̂?1 ≠ ?̂?2. The three types of workers vary in their degree of 
participation/information in the contract setting procedure in the following way: 
• Worker of Type A (the representative) is informed about the contract 
alternatives 𝑣1 and 𝑣2, and decides which of those will be implemented. 
The chosen contract is denoted by 𝑣 ∈ {𝑣1, 𝑣2} which is valid for all three 
workers facing the same firm. 
1 These specifications ensure that profits are non-negative and that more effort leads to greater joint income, so 
that higher levels of effort are encouraged from the standpoint of social welfare. Hence, a proposed work 
contract 𝑣 = (𝑤, ?̂?) can be interpreted as a proposal of the firm to the worker about how to share the produced 
surplus. 
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• Worker of Type B is informed about the contract alternatives 𝑣1 and 𝑣2, 
and about the fact that the implemented contract 𝑣 has been chosen by 
worker A. 
• Worker of Type C is informed about the finally implemented contract 𝑣. 
She remains ignorant with respect to the details of the two alternatives 𝑣1 
and 𝑣2. 
The different degrees of involvement (participation and revealed information) in the 
contract setting are presented in Table 2, which is common information for all 
participants. 
 
Table 2: Participation, Information, and Control 
 Participation Information Control 
Type A x x  
Type B  x  
Type C   x 
 
The crucial point in this set-up is the fact that the only difference between workers 
of Types A, B, and C (who are matched to the same firm) is the degree of participation 
and information in the contract setting procedure. All other parameters of relevance, 
especially the payoff-relevant contract details, are the same among the three workers 
because the final contract is identical for all workers who are matched to the same firm 
in a given round.2 Hence, systematic differences in behavior in terms of effort exertion 
between the three types can be traced back to differences in the contract setting 
procedure in the following sense: Comparing effort of worker Type A with Type B will 
reveal the behavioral reactions induced by participation in the contract setting process, 
while the comparison between Type B and C will reveal behavioral reactions to the fact 
whether or not a worker is informed about work contract details. In this way our design 
2 This feature also implies that theories based on payoff-relevant characteristics, for instance, standard game 
theoretical approaches based on own payoff-maximization or distribution-dependent theories like Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000) or Fehr and Schmidt (2000), would not predict systematic differences in behavior between the 
three types of workers that are matched to the same firm. 
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allows us to identify the consequences from participation and information in the contract 
setting process based on the behavioral responses to the different treatments. 
A natural hypothesis with respect to expected differences in behavior would 
suggest that participation enhances performance in the sense that workers of Type A, 
who have a say in the contract setting process, exert more effort than workers of Type B 
who do not participate, or Type C, who neither participate nor are informed about the 
details of the contract options. This hypothesis could be justified based on different 
psychological arguments, for instance, because subjects honor procedurally fair 
procedures, because they react more ‘pro-socially’ if they have greater responsibility for 
the joint outcome or autonomy in general, or because they identify more with the firms’ 
objectives after they participated in wage setting.3 However, our analysis will reveal that 
this hypothesis does generally not hold in our context (there is rather evidence for a 
decline in effort exertion) and that information plays no major role in driving behavioral 
differences between treatments  
 
Conducting the Experiment 
The experiment was conducted in the laboratory of the University of Trier (TrEx). 
Subjects were 188 students from various fields recruited by ORSEE, see Greiner 
(2003). The experiment was computerized using the software z-tree, see Fischbacher 
(2007). Subjects were paid a 2.50 Euro show-up fee plus additional money depending 
on the decisions made during the experiment, resulting in an average payment of 10.20 
Euro. Before the experimental sessions started subjects were randomly assigned to one 
of four roles (firm, worker Type A, worker Type B, or worker Type C). All subjects 
kept their roles during the whole experiment, which consisted of six rounds. After each 
round group members were re-matched to make sure that no subject played with the 
3 Besides the aforementioned experimental studies on the delegation of wage choice, there exists a number of 
studies that share this type of hypothesis in related frameworks; see Charness (2000), Charness and Jackson 
(2009), Dal Bó et al. (2010), Cornet and González (2013). We refer to these papers for further details on the 
justification of this hypothesis. 
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same participants more than once. When the experiment was over and all decisions 
made, one of the six rounds was randomly, individually, and independently determined 
for each subject to be payoff-relevant.4 A post-experimental questionnaire was 
conducted among all participants to obtain additional information with respect to basic 
personal details such as gender, age, number of siblings, field of study, general risk 
attitudes, etc., but also to get some information on subjects’ impressions with respect to 
their influence and the perceived fairness of the contract setting procedure. 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
 Type C Type B Type A All Types 
EXERTED EFFORT (e) 0.362 0.335 0.307 0.335 
WAGE (w) 56.113 56.113 56.113 56.113 
DESIRED EFFORT (ê) 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.714 
     
NOTE: All presented values are averages. Summary statistics of other variables of interest are provided in 
Table A.1 in Appendix 1. 
 
 
3. Experimental Results and Discussion 
In Table 3 we present summary results of variables of interest for each treatment 
(Type) separated and aggregated. As work contracts are identical in each group, the 
average fixed wage and desired effort based on the finally implemented work contract 
coincide for all Types, while the average exerted effort varies between treatments. A 
comparison between Types reveals that exerted effort is highest in the control treatment 
(Type C: 0.362) and lowest in the participation treatment (Type A: 0.307), where this 
difference is significant with a p-value of 0.022 (Mann-Whitney test, two-sided5). 
Workers who are informed about the details of the alternative work contracts but do not 
4 This procedure implied that the finally realized payoffs of two co-workers (who were matched to the same firm 
in one round) were not related to each other. As this randomized final payoff determination procedure was also 
public information ex-ante, it minimized the possibility that workers’ motivation for exertion was driven by 
other-regarding preferences towards co-workers. As explained before, our modified gift-exchange game can de 
facto be perceived as a bilateral game between one isolated worker and one firm.    
5 If not otherwise stated, we use two-sided non-parametric tests.  
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participate in the wage setting process choose an intermediate effort level (Type B: 
0.355). If we compare effort exertion between Types A vs. B (p=0.251) and Type B vs. 
C (p=0.260), the differences are too small to be significant. However, if we compare 
effort exertion under the participation treatment (Type A) against the two Types without 
participation (Type B and Type C), we observe a difference of 0.041, which is 
significant at p=0.047. Similar results hold for the comparison between information 
(Type A and B) versus no information, where the difference of 0.040 is significant with 
a p-value of 0.048. Hence, in our version of the gift-exchange game, there is no 
evidence for performance-enhancing effects of (limited) workers’ participation in the 
wage setting process, but rather some evidence for a decline in effort exertion.6  
While this observation has already some value in itself, it does not shed light on 
the underlying motivations of the workers of different Types. In the following, we 
therefore analyze in more detail what contributes to the comparatively low effort 
exertion of Type A and B. We concentrate first on a graphical analysis of the wage 
dependency of effort choices and then on variation in exerted effort over time (rounds). 
Finally, we account for both of these factors in an econometric analysis which also 
allows us to control for individual heterogeneity. 
In Figure 1 (top) we present a histogram of the wage distribution based on the 
finally chosen contract, while Figure 1 (bottom) shows the corresponding average level 
of exerted effort for each wage decile, separated for Types. As in previous studies there 
is a positive relation between effort and wages (indicating employees’ reciprocal 
inclinations), however, the size of this effort-wage gradient differs among Types: For 
Type A, there is virtually no increase in effort for low wages and also for intermediate 
wage levels the increase in effort exertion is less pronounced than for Type B or C. Only 
6 The negative incentive effect of participation and/or information is also reflected in the relative amount of free-
riding (exerting minimal effort of 0.1) because the percentage of free-riding is lowest for Type C (37.6 %), 
substantially higher for Type B (41.5%), and highest for Type A (41.8%). Excluding the observations with free-
riding does not alter the qualitative results with respect to average effort comparisons: Without free-riding, 
average effort is highest for Type C (0.519), intermediate for Type B (0.502), and lowest for Type A (0.457). 
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for the highest wage interval (90-120) is the increase in effort exertion by Type A 
considerable, and even substantially higher than for Type B or C.7 
 
 
Figure 1: Wage and Effort Distributions 
 
  
7 For Type B there are no obvious systematical differences in comparison to Type A or C. 
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Overall, the graphical analysis suggests that Type A workers are less inclined to 
exert high effort for low and intermediate wage levels in comparison to workers of Type 
B or C. One explanation for the observed behavior of Type A workers would be that the 
participation treatment triggers reciprocal motivations from the respective workers, 
which is addressed in more detail in the econometric analysis.8 
 
Figure 2: Average Effort per Round 
 
 
In Figure 2 we present the average exerted effort per round for each Type 
separately. We observe a decline in effort exertion in the first three rounds for all three 
Types which stabilizes in the last three rounds of each session. There are no specific 
end-game effects, as expected, due to the re-matching after each round. More 
importantly, the results from the previous analysis (rather negative incentive effects 
from participation) are replicated in the round-specific analysis: Effort exertion of Type 
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effort exertion by Type B lies (in nearly all rounds) between those of Type A and C.9 
Hence, the graphical analysis based on Figures 1 and 2 confirms the already observed 
negative incentive effect from participation, which is summarized in the following 
result. 
 
RESULT 1: Workers’ participation in the wage setting process does not lead to an 
increase in average effort exertion; instead there is a rather a decline in performance. 
 
Figure 2 also suggests that the difference between Types declines in later rounds 
of the experiment, such that effort exertion becomes nearly indistinguishable among 
treatments in the last rounds. Although our analysis of the post-experimental 
questionnaire reveals that there are significant differences in the perceived influence on 
(and the fairness of) the wage decision process between the different treatments,10 it 
might be that the importance of these differences for effort exertion fades out in later 
rounds.  
Overall, the graphical analysis indicates two behavioral patterns that have to be 
accounted for in the subsequent econometric analysis: Firstly, Figure 1 suggests that 
differences in effort exertion due to more or less involvement in the work contract 
process are dependent on the respective wage level. Secondly, Figure 2 implies that 
differences in behavior occur more predominantly in early rounds of the interaction.  
 
9 The spike observed in round 3 for Type A can be attributed to three subjects that exerted maximum effort of 
e=1.0 (which was also the respectively desired effort in these groups). Excluding these observations would result 
in average effort of 0.295 for Type A in round 3. Moreover, in this case all pairwise Type comparisons would 
become significant, comp. footnote 6. 
10 Perceived influence is measured by the degree of agreement with the statement: "I did not have any influence 
on contract determination" (with range 1 ‘disagree’ to 7 ‘agree’). As the reported value for workers of Type C is 
comparatively high (5.383), the perceived influence of these workers is, as expected, relatively low. For workers 
of Type B, the value is accordingly lower (4.894), while for workers of Type A it is lowest (3.128), which 
implies that, as expected, workers of Type A correctly perceive themselves as having a greater influence on the 
wage setting procedure. (All pairwise differences between Types are highly significant based on the same non-
parametric tests that have been applied previously). Interestingly, the measure for procedural fairness (agreement 
with the statement: "I think that the procedure for determining the contract is fair") is similar for Type A (3.319) 
and Type B (3.340) and, as expected, higher in comparison to Type C (2.936), where only the last difference is 
significant. 
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Regression Analysis 
The robustness of our previous results is analyzed based on regression techniques 
which allow us to consider explicitly the aforementioned patterns and to control for 
individual heterogeneity on the subject level. There is a substantial fraction of free-
riding among workers (who exerted the minimum amount of effort, comp. footnote no. 
7) which implies that the experimental data is left-censored with respect to exerted 
effort. We therefore resort to an econometric analysis based on random-effects Tobit 
regressions, where the dependent variable is EXERTED EFFORT, while subject is the panel 
identifier.11 We additionally include round and session dummies, as well as individual 
covariates on the subject level (that stem from the answers to the post-experimental 
questionnaires) to control for systematic variations along these dimensions. All variables 
are described and summarized in Table A1 in the appendix. 
Before we analyze behavioral differences between treatments, we provide results 
from regressions for each worker Type separately (Table 4, columns 1 – 3) and jointly 
(Table 4, column 4).12 The obtained results are in line with the observations from the 
non-parametric and graphical analysis; there is, for instance, a positive and significant 
wage-gradient for each worker type and also for the pooled data set.13 There is also a 
significant positive effect of DESIRED EFFORT (although it is non-binding for workers) 
which is frequently reported in previous studies. More importantly, the comparison of 
the type-specific regression results reveals that the effort-wage gradient is steepest for 
workers of Type A while the respective constant is, at the same time, the lowest among 
11 Our results are robust with respect to various alternative specifications; for instance, using group (and not 
subject) as an alternative panel identifier (comp. robustness check No. 3 in the appendix, Tables A8 and A9), 
applying random-effects generalized least squares as alternative regression technique (comp. robustness check 
No. 2, Tables A6 and A7). Using the latter approach, robustness is even maintained if observations with free-
riding behavior are excluded from the analysis (to address the issue of left-censored data in a random-effects 
generalized least squares framework), comp. robustness check No. 4, Tables A10 and A11. 
12 Here, we only report the variables of interest (i.e. WAGE, DESIRED EFFORT, and Constant). In Table A2 in the 
appendix we present the regression results in more detail, including the round dummies, as well as subject 
specific explanatory variables FEMALE, NO. FRIENDS, AGE, and RISK, that are mostly non-significant (the only 
exception is FEMALE, NO. FRIENDS, and AGE for Type B). All results are maintained if non-significant 
explanatory variables are excluded from the regression equation. 
13 There is also some evidence for the general decline in exerted effort in the first rounds (observed in Figure 2) 
because the round dummies are declining for all types, comp. Table A2 in the appendix. 
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all types. This suggests that workers of Type A react more negatively to low wage 
offers14 but at the same time more positively to high wage offers, which would indicate 
that Type A workers are more inclined towards reciprocal behavior than Type B or C 
workers. The following two subsections address this issue by focusing on treatment 
comparisons in line with Table 2. 
 
 
Table 4: Random-Effects Tobit Regressions for Separated and Aggregated Types 
Dependent Variable:  
EXERTED EFFORT 
(1) 
Type C 
(2) 
Type B 
(3) 
Type A 
(4) 
All Types 
     
Constant -0.4424*** -0.2542 -0.6258*** -0.4486*** 
 (0.1594) (0.1906) (0.1806) (0.1035) 
     
WAGE 0.0089*** 0.0071*** 0.0097*** 0.0087*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0005) 
     
DESIRED EFFORT 0.2522*** 0.3384*** 0.1619** 0.2455*** 
 (0.0875) (0.0913) (0.0731) (0.0492) 
     
No. of observations 282 282 282 846 
     
NOTE: All estimations are the result of random-effects Tobit regressions that are left-
censored at 0.1 with subject as the panel identifier.  Round and session dummies are included, 
as well as other variables on the subject level (FEMALE, NO. FRIENDS, AGE, and RISK, comp. 
Table A1 for details on these variables).  
* denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** 
denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
The Participation Treatment 
The incentive effects of participation in the wage setting process are analyzed by 
testing explicitly for differences in effort exertion between workers of Type A, who are 
allowed to participate in the contract choice, and workers of Type B, who are not 
involved in the choice of the final contract but face identical information with respect to 
14 Note that the observed variable EXERTED EFFORT is left-censored at 0.1 while the latent variable from the 
random-effects Tobit regression (i.e. predicted EXERTED EFFORT) might be actually less than 0.1 (especially for 
low wage offers). In column 1, for instance, the constant is significantly negative which reflects the high 
frequency of free-riding of Type A workers if they face low or intermediate wage offers. Our statement that 
workers of Type A react more negatively to lower wage offers refers to this interpretation.    
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the alternative contract specifications. As already mentioned, the graphical analysis 
suggested that differences in behavior are more pronounced in the first than in the last 
rounds of the experiment, and that effort exertion is highly wage dependent. In the 
econometric analysis, we take these observations into account by running separate 
random-effects Tobit regressions for the first three rounds (Table 5, column 2 and 5) and 
the last three rounds (presented in Table 5, column 3 and 6). Moreover, we introduce the 
interaction variable A*WAGE between the treatment variable and the fixed wage 
covariate (Table 5, columns 4 – 6) to check whether there are significant differences in 
the effort-wage gradient for the participation treatment. 
 
Table 5: Random- Effects Tobit Regressions Types A and B 
Dependent Variable:  
EXERTED EFFORT 
(1) 
All 
Rounds 
(2) 
Rounds 
1-3 
(3) 
Rounds 
4-6 
(4) 
All 
Rounds 
(5) 
Rounds 
1-3 
(6) 
Rounds 
4-6 
       
Constant -0.4964*** -0.6545*** -0.2901* -0.4288*** -0.5136*** -0.2431 
 (0.1318) (0.1394) (0.1613) (0.1356) (0.1451) (0.1674) 
       
A -0.0109 -0.0085 -0.0123 -0.1464 -0.2520** -0.1309 
 (0.0566) (0.0514) (0.0673) (0.0890) (0.1048) (0.1280) 
       
A*WAGE    0.0022** 0.0040*** 0.0020 
    (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0018) 
       
WAGE 0.0085*** 0.0082*** 0.0086*** 0.0074*** 0.0062*** 0.0077*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0013) 
       
DESIRED EFFORT 0.2445*** 0.3119*** 0.1697** 0.2438*** 0.3057*** 0.1662* 
 (0.0587) (0.0915) (0.0857) (0.0585) (0.0893) (0.0852) 
       
No. of observations 564 282 282 564 282 282 
       
Notes: All estimations are the result of random-effects Tobit Regressions that are left-censored at 0.1 and 
where subject is the panel identifier.  Round and session dummies are included but not reported here, as 
well as other variables on the subject level (comp. Table A3 in the appendix for the full results).  
* denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level. 
 
Results presented in Table 5, columns 1 – 3, imply that the pure participation 
treatment effect is negative but not significant. However, Figure 1 already suggested 
that the non-significance was to be expected because differences in effort exertion 
between treatments are also wage dependent. This dependency is addressed in Table 4, 
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columns 4 – 6, based on the additional treatment interaction term A*WAGE. In line with 
Figure 2, we observe that for the first three rounds there are in fact significant treatment 
effects from participation: The effort-wage gradient is positive and significant in 
columns 4 and 5, and therefore steeper for workers of Type A. Hence, workers who 
participated in the wage setting process react more positively to increases in the wage 
offers. At the same time the pure treatment dummy A becomes significantly negative in 
column 5, which implies that workers of Type A react significantly more negatively to 
low wage offers at least in the first three rounds.15 Thus, the econometric analysis 
confirms the hypothesized reciprocal behavior of Type A workers, which has already 
been posited in the graphical analysis based on Figure 1.16 
Moreover, the non-parametric analysis already showed that average effort exertion 
of Type A workers is comparatively low which suggests that negative incentive effects 
from participation dominate workers’ behavior. Based on our regression results this 
implies that the percentage of low wage offers (that lead to comparatively low effort 
exertion by Type A workers) is sufficiently high such that the negative incentive effects 
from low wage offers dominate on average the behavior of Type A workers in 
comparison to Type B or C workers. Hence, the participation treatment seems to trigger 
rather negative reciprocal behavior of the respective workers. 
 
RESULT 2: The observed behavior under the participation treatment suggests that 
negative reciprocity is the dominant motive for workers’ behavior. 
 
Formal theories of reciprocal behavior like Rabin (1983) or Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger (2004) provide a theoretical explanation for this observation. These 
theories are based on the notion of the perceived kindness of a specific player’s action 
15 We refer to footnote No. 14 for a clarification of our statement on the negative reaction to low wage offers in a 
context where free-riding is frequently observed. 
16 These results are robust with respect to alternative econometric specifications and techniques, comp. 
robustness checks no. 1 – 5, Tables A5, A6, A8, A10, and A12 in the appendix. 
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which implies that unkind behavior leads to a negative reciprocal reaction by the 
respective counterpart and vice versa for kind behavior. For the standard gift-exchange 
game there is experimental evidence that this theoretical argument can explain low 
effort exertion as a reaction to low wage offers (comp. Charness 2004). In our 
modification of the gift-exchange game with two alternative wage contracts there is 
even more potential for negative reciprocity because low wage offers in the final 
contract are often accompanied by even lower wage offers from the alternative (not 
chosen) contract.17 Hence, workers who are informed about the details of the two 
alternative contracts (Type A and B) frequently face not only one low wage offer but 
two, where both offers can be fully attributed to the volition of the firm. Especially 
workers of Type A, who then have to decide between the two (comparably bad) contract 
alternatives, might perceive this type of configuration as a particularly unkind act on the 
part of the firm, which then triggers the substantially negative reaction, that is, 
comparatively low effort exertion. Note also that competing theoretical approaches 
based on procedural fairness considerations mentioned in the introduction have no 
explanatory power in our framework: The negative reciprocity motive seems to 
dominate alternative explanations.  
 
The Information Treatment 
In Table 6 we present the results from random-effects Tobit regressions based on 
observations from workers of Type B and C to trace out the incentive effects of different 
degrees of information with respect to the details of the two contract alternatives. While 
the general results observed in the context of Table 3 (significantly negative constant, 
positive effect from WAGE, and small positive effect from DESIRED EFFORT) are 
preserved in all specifications of Table 6, we also observe that treatment effects (i.e. the 
pure treatment dummy B and the treatment interaction B*WAGE) remain mostly non-
17 In 81 percent of all observations, workers of Type A choose as final contract the one with the higher fixed 
wage. 
 18 
                                                 
 
significant.18 The negative reciprocal behavior to low wage offers by Type A workers, 
who are in some sense advantaged (in comparison to Type B workers) with respect to 
the wage setting procedure, is not observed for Type B workers who are advantaged (in 
comparison to Type C workers) with respect to the amount of provided information on 
contract alternatives. Hence, the additional information provided to workers of Type B 
about the details of the alternative (non-chosen) work contract does not seem to affect 
the behavior of Type B workers in a substantial way. 
 
Table 6: Random- Effects Tobit Regressions Types B and C 
Dependent Variable:  
EXERTED EFFORT 
(1) 
All 
Rounds 
(2) 
Rounds 
1-3 
(3) 
Rounds 
4-6 
(4) 
All Rounds 
(5) 
Rounds 
1-3 
(6) 
Rounds 
4-6 
       
Constant -0.3362*** -0.4124*** -0.2543* -0.3881*** -0.5173*** -0.2726* 
 (0.1274) (0.1532) (0.1448) (0.1327) (0.1627) (0.1557) 
       
B -0.0534 -0.0615 -0.0493 0.0467 0.1381 -0.0144 
 (0.0526) (0.0545) (0.0572) (0.0900) (0.1165) (0.1221) 
       
B*WAGE    -0.0016 -0.0033* -0.0006 
    (0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0018) 
       
WAGE 0.0081*** 0.0080*** 0.0075*** 0.0089*** 0.0096*** 0.0078*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
       
DESIRED EFFORT 0.2904*** 0.2826*** 0.3206*** 0.2912*** 0.2872*** 0.3200*** 
 (0.0638) (0.0979) (0.0915) (0.0637) (0.0974) (0.0915) 
       
No. of observations 564 282 282 564 282 282 
       
Notes: All estimations are the result of random-effects Tobit Regressions that are left-censored at 0.1 and 
where subject is the panel identifier.  Round and Session dummies are included but not reported here. * 
denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In this experimental study, we analyze the effects of involvement in the contract 
setting process based on a modified gift-exchange game between workers and firms 
18 The only exception is the effort-wage gradient in the first three rounds in column 5, which is (weakly) 
significantly negative. This result, however, is not maintained in all robustness checks.  
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where some workers have a say in the design of the finally implemented work contract. 
Our results reveal that there is no automatism between workers’ participation in 
managerial decision-making and improved firm performance. We rather observe 
negative incentive effects from workers’ participation in the wage setting process: 
Workers who are endowed with participation rights are reluctant to exert more effort if 
they face higher wage offers (which seems to be driven by negative reciprocity) in 
comparison to workers who are not allowed to participate. The consequence is a 
decrease in effort exertion and performance, which is in contrast to the positive 
incentive effects from participation that have been observed in some previous 
experimental studies. At the same time, however, our results are more in line with the 
mixed and ambiguous results on workers’ co-determination from the empirical 
literature. 
Arguably, the institution of workers’ participation that we apply in our study 
differs substantially from experiments that completely delegate the wage choice to 
workers. However, different mechanisms of co-determination can also be observed in 
the real world, which might lead to very different perceptions of affected individuals 
and therefore also to very different incentive structures and performance outcomes. 
Hence, further analysis of the relation between specific institutions of workers’ 
performance and their incentives would constitute a valuable contribution.  
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 Appendix 1 
 
Table A1: Summary Statistics and Description of Variables 
Variables  Description of Variables Range Type C Type B Type A All Types 
       
EXERTED EFFORT (e) Effort chosen by workers 0.1 – 1.0 0.362 0.335 0.307 0.335 
       
WAGE (w) Fixed wage of finally 
chosen contract v 
20 – 120 56.113 56.113 56.113 56.113 
       
DESIRED EFFORT (ê) Desired effort of finally 
chosen contract v 
0.1 – 1.0 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.714 
       
FEMALE Percentage of female 
subjects 
0 – 1 0.447 0.553 0.702 0.567 
       
AGE Normalized age of subjects 0 – 64 59.191 57.702 58.957 58.617 
       
NO. FRIENDS No. of friends of subjects 0 – 12 0.213 0.348 0.255 0.355 
       
RISK Risk affinity. Answer to 
Question No. 6 
1 – 10 5.298 4.489 5.061 4.950 
       
Procedural Fairness Answer to Question No. 1 1 – 7 2.936 3.340 3.319 3.199 
       
Outcome Fairness Answer to Question No. 2 1 – 7 3.340 3.787 3.277 3.468 
       
Comprehensibility Answer to Question No. 3 1 – 7 4.574 4.319 4.660 4.518 
       
Outcome Satisfaction Answer to Question No. 4 1 – 7 3.723 3.915 3.575 3.738 
       
No Influence Answer to Question No. 5 1 – 7 5.383 4.894 3.128 4.468 
       
No. of Workers   47 47 47 141 
       
No. of observations   282 282 282 846 
       
Notes: All figures are averages with the exception of FEMALE (percentage). Exact formulations of 
questions from the post-experimental questionnaire are provided in the instructions, Appendix 2.  
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Table A2: Random-Effects Tobit Regressions for Separated and Aggregated Types 
 
Dependent Variable: 
EXERTED EFFORT 
(1)  
Type C 
(2)  
Type B 
(3)  
Type A 
(4)  
All Types 
     
Constant -0.4424*** -0.2542 -0.6258*** -0.4486*** 
 (0.1594) (0.1906) (0.1806) (0.1035) 
     
WAGE 0.0089*** 0.0071*** 0.0097*** 0.0087*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0005) 
     
DESIRED EFFORT 0.2522*** 0.3384*** 0.1619** 0.2455*** 
 (0.0875) (0.0913) (0.0731) (0.0492) 
     
FEMALE -0.0040 -0.1456* -0.0890 -0.0575 
 (0.0706) (0.0840) (0.0897) (0.0470) 
     
NO. FRIENDS 0.0051 0.1156*** -0.0398 0.0309 
 (0.0738) (0.0428) (0.0836) (0.0299) 
     
AGE -0.0050 0.0169** -0.0136 0.0023 
 (0.0115) (0.0083) (0.0153) (0.0057) 
     
RISK 0.0023 -0.0279 0.0067 -0.0086 
 (0.0164) (0.0174) (0.0187) (0.0100) 
     
Dummy Round 1  0.1193** 0.1369*** 0.1123** 0.1227*** 
 (0.0510) (0.0530) (0.0444) (0.0291) 
     
Dummy Round 2  0.0948* 0.0184 0.0170 0.0444 
 (0.0528) (0.0546) (0.0459) (0.0301) 
     
Dummy Round 3  0.0294 -0.1007* 0.0607 -0.0010 
 (0.0527) (0.0563) (0.0456) (0.0302) 
     
Dummy Round 4  0.0101 -0.0527 -0.0042 -0.0156 
 (0.0532) (0.0558) (0.0470) (0.0306) 
     
Dummy Round 5  0.0107 -0.0397 0.0095 -0.0080 
 (0.0530) (0.0557) (0.0467) (0.0305) 
     
Number of Observations 282 282 282 846 
     
Notes: All estimations are the result of random-effects Tobit Regressions that are left-censored at 0.1 
and where subject is the panel identifier.  Round and Session dummies are included where only the first 
mentioned are reported (with round no. 6 as the base round). * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** 
denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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 Table A3: Random-Effects Tobit Regressions Types A and B 
Notes: All estimations are the result of random-effects Tobit Regressions that are left-censored at 0.1 and where 
subject is the panel identifier.  Round and Session dummies are included but not reported here. * denotes 
significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% 
level. 
 
 
  
Dependent Variable:  
EXERTED EFFORT 
(1)  
All  
Rounds 
(2)  
Rounds 
 1-3 
(3)  
Rounds  
4-6 
(4)  
All Rounds 
(5)  
Rounds  
1-3 
(6)  
Rounds  
4-6 
       
Constant -0.4964*** -0.6545*** -0.2901* -0.4288*** -0.5136*** -0.2431 
 (0.1318) (0.1394) (0.1613) (0.1356) (0.1451) (0.1674) 
       
A -0.0109 -0.0085 -0.0123 -0.1464 -0.2520** -0.1309 
 (0.0566) (0.0514) (0.0673) (0.0890) (0.1048) (0.1280) 
       
A*WAGE    0.0022** 0.0040*** 0.0020 
    (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0018) 
       
WAGE 0.0085*** 0.0082*** 0.0086*** 0.0074*** 0.0062*** 0.0077*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0013) 
       
DESIRED EFFORT 0.2445*** 0.3119*** 0.1697** 0.2438*** 0.3057*** 0.1662* 
 (0.0587) (0.0915) (0.0857) (0.0585) (0.0893) (0.0852) 
       
FEMALE -0.0643 -0.0000 -0.1176 -0.0674 -0.0038 -0.1207 
 (0.0612) (0.0560) (0.0725) (0.0613) (0.0552) (0.0734) 
       
NO. FRIENDS 0.0430 0.0274 0.0573 0.0414 0.0252 0.0563 
 (0.0359) (0.0325) (0.0428) (0.0359) (0.0319) (0.0432) 
       
AGE 0.0035 -0.0014 0.0084 0.0035 -0.0017 0.0086 
 (0.0069) (0.0063) (0.0083) (0.0069) (0.0062) (0.0084) 
       
RISK -0.0061 -0.0006 -0.0123 -0.0058 -0.0021 -0.0107 
 (0.0126) (0.0114) (0.0150) (0.0126) (0.0113) (0.0153) 
       
No. of observations 564 282 282 564 282 282 
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 Table A4: Random-Effects Tobit Regressions Types B and C 
Notes: All estimations are the result of random-effects Tobit Regressions that are left-censored at 0.1 and where 
subject is the panel identifier.  Round and Session dummies are included but not reported here. * denotes 
significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% 
level. 
 
  
Dependent Variable:  
EXERTED EFFORT 
(1)  
All  
Rounds 
(2)  
Rounds 
 1-3 
(3)  
Rounds  
4-6 
(4)  
All Rounds 
(5)  
Rounds  
1-3 
(6)  
Rounds  
4-6 
       
Constant -0.3362*** -0.4124*** -0.2543* -0.3881*** -0.5173*** -0.2726* 
 (0.1274) (0.1532) (0.1448) (0.1327) (0.1627) (0.1557) 
       
B -0.0534 -0.0615 -0.0493 0.0467 0.1381 -0.0144 
 (0.0526) (0.0545) (0.0572) (0.0900) (0.1165) (0.1221) 
       
B*WAGE    -0.0016 -0.0033* -0.0006 
    (0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0018) 
       
WAGE 0.0081*** 0.0080*** 0.0075*** 0.0089*** 0.0096*** 0.0078*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
       
DESIRED EFFORT 0.2904*** 0.2826*** 0.3206*** 0.2912*** 0.2872*** 0.3200*** 
 (0.0638) (0.0979) (0.0915) (0.0637) (0.0974) (0.0915) 
       
FEMALE -0.0474 -0.0107 -0.0802 -0.0488 -0.0137 -0.0807 
 (0.0553) (0.0574) (0.0601) (0.0549) (0.0566) (0.0601) 
       
NO. FRIENDS 0.0569* 0.0385 0.0692* 0.0564* 0.0388 0.0688* 
 (0.0332) (0.0344) (0.0362) (0.0330) (0.0339) (0.0362) 
       
AGE 0.0068 0.0031 0.0089 0.0069 0.0034 0.0089 
 (0.0063) (0.0065) (0.0069) (0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0069) 
       
RISK -0.0176 -0.0111 -0.0237* -0.0170 -0.0107 -0.0233* 
 (0.0117) (0.0121) (0.0127) (0.0116) (0.0119) (0.0128) 
       
No. of observations 564 282 282 564 282 282 
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 Table A5: Robustness Check 1: Random-Effects Tobit Regressions All Types 
Notes: All estimations are the result of random-effects Tobit Regressions that are left-censored at 0.1 and where 
subject is the panel identifier. The benchmark type is here Type B (which also holds for Tables A6-A8) because 
this allows direct comparison of the significant results for Type A presented in Table 5 and Table A3. Round and 
Session dummies are included but not reported here. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes 
significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
  
Dependent Variable:  
EXERTED EFFORT 
(1)  
All  
Rounds 
(2)  
Rounds 
 1-3 
(3)  
Rounds  
4-6 
(4)  
All Rounds 
(5)  
Rounds  
1-3 
(6)  
Rounds  
4-6 
       
Constant -0.4634*** -0.5739*** -0.3295*** -0.3885*** -0.4210*** -0.2929** 
 (0.1064) (0.1198) (0.1244) (0.1130) (0.1302) (0.1367) 
       
A -0.0132 -0.0077 -0.0170 -0.1480* -0.2514** -0.1087 
 (0.0560) (0.0546) (0.0626) (0.0895) (0.1097) (0.1261) 
       
A*WAGE    0.0022* 0.0040** 0.0016 
    (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0018) 
       
C 0.0441 0.0520 0.0407 -0.0471 -0.1344 0.0041 
 (0.0559) (0.0546) (0.0621) (0.0895) (0.1119) (0.1208) 
       
C*WAGE    0.0015 0.0031* 0.0006 
    (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0017) 
       
WAGE 0.0086*** 0.0087*** 0.0082*** 0.0074*** 0.0063*** 0.0076*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0013) 
       
DESIRED EFFORT 0.2455*** 0.2931*** 0.2129*** 0.2452*** 0.2909*** 0.2117*** 
 (0.0492) (0.0767) (0.0712) (0.0491) (0.0756) (0.0710) 
       
FEMALE -0.0475 -0.0210 -0.0644 -0.0496 -0.0240 -0.0656 
 (0.0478) (0.0469) (0.0533) (0.0478) (0.0463) (0.0537) 
       
NO. FRIENDS 0.0318 0.0215 0.0409 0.0305 0.0203 0.0399 
 (0.0300) (0.0292) (0.0333) (0.0299) (0.0289) (0.0335) 
       
AGE 0.0021 -0.0008 0.0044 0.0021 -0.0008 0.0045 
 (0.0057) (0.0055) (0.0063) (0.0057) (0.0055) (0.0064) 
       
RISK -0.0091 -0.0017 -0.0164 -0.0087 -0.0024 -0.0156 
 (0.0101) (0.0098) (0.0112) (0.0101) (0.0097) (0.0114) 
       
No. of observations 846 423 423 846 423 423 
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 Table A6: Robustness Check 2: Random-Effects GLS Regressions Types A and B 
Notes: All estimations are the result of random-effects GLS Regressions with robust standard errors clustered at 
the subject level. Round and Session dummies are not included because otherwise there would be more variables 
to be estimated than clusters.  * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level 
and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
  
Dependent Variable:  
EXERTED EFFORT 
(1)  
All  
Rounds 
(2)  
Rounds 
 1-3 
(3)  
Rounds  
4-6 
(4)  
All 
Rounds 
(5)  
Rounds  
1-3 
(6)  
Rounds  
4-6 
       
Constant -0.0551 -0.1075 0.0380 -0.0219 -0.0156 0.0481 
 (0.0591) (0.0673) (0.0788) (0.0615) (0.0723) (0.0862) 
       
A -0.0138 -0.0088 -0.0190 -0.0796 -0.1742*** -0.0411 
 (0.0327) (0.0343) (0.0373) (0.0587) (0.0637) (0.0767) 
       
A*WAGE    0.0012 0.0029** 0.0004 
    (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0016) 
       
WAGE 0.0056*** 0.0060*** 0.0048*** 0.0050*** 0.0046*** 0.0046*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0012) 
       
DESIRED EFFORT 0.1555*** 0.1541*** 0.1182** 0.1558*** 0.1579*** 0.1174** 
 (0.0363) (0.0574) (0.0533) (0.0363) (0.0564) (0.0519) 
       
FEMALE -0.0370 -0.0070 -0.0715* -0.0386 -0.0111 -0.0720* 
 (0.0332) (0.0336) (0.0414) (0.0332) (0.0336) (0.0418) 
       
NO. FRIENDS 0.0325 0.0325 0.0322 0.0321 0.0316 0.0320 
 (0.0199) (0.0249) (0.0196) (0.0197) (0.0242) (0.0196) 
       
AGE -0.0056 -0.0015 -0.0091 -0.0055 -0.0029 -0.0088 
 (0.0076) (0.0079) (0.0088) (0.0076) (0.0079) (0.0087) 
       
RISK 0.0045 0.0027 0.0066* 0.0046 0.0027 0.0067* 
 (0.0039) (0.0050) (0.0037) (0.0039) (0.0049) (0.0038) 
       
No. of observations 564 282 282 564 282 282 
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 Table A7: Robustness Check 2: Random- Effects GLS Regressions Types B and C 
Notes: All estimations are the result of random-effects GLS Regressions with robust standard errors clustered at 
the subject level. Round and Session dummies are not included because otherwise there would be more variables 
to be estimated than clusters.  * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level 
and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
  
Dependent Variable:  
EXERTED EFFORT 
(1)  
All  
Rounds 
(2)  
Rounds 
 1-3 
(3)  
Rounds  
4-6 
(4)  
All 
Rounds 
(5)  
Rounds  
1-3 
(6)  
Rounds  
4-6 
       
Constant -0.0281 -0.0262 0.0067 -0.0562 -0.0931 0.0040 
 (0.0601) (0.0702) (0.0739) (0.0675) (0.0715) (0.0830) 
       
B -0.0361 -0.0510 -0.0205 0.0171 0.0784 -0.0152 
 (0.0303) (0.0346) (0.0342) (0.0612) (0.0723) (0.0791) 
       
B*WAGE    -0.0009 -0.0023* -0.0001 
    (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0015) 
       
WAGE 0.0053*** 0.0056*** 0.0044*** 0.0058*** 0.0067*** 0.0045*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0011) 
       
DESIRED EFFORT 0.1859*** 0.1754*** 0.1914*** 0.1864*** 0.1792*** 0.1912*** 
 (0.0362) (0.0597) (0.0496) (0.0360) (0.0586) (0.0493) 
       
FEMALE -0.0195 -0.0057 -0.0357 -0.0198 -0.0063 -0.0358 
 (0.0339) (0.0392) (0.0388) (0.0337) (0.0390) (0.0389) 
       
NO. FRIENDS 0.0308* 0.0255 0.0367** 0.0306* 0.0257 0.0366** 
 (0.0181) (0.0240) (0.0178) (0.0179) (0.0231) (0.0178) 
       
AGE -0.0076 -0.0050 -0.0098 -0.0073 -0.0053 -0.0097 
 (0.0073) (0.0084) (0.0081) (0.0073) (0.0083) (0.0081) 
       
RISK 0.0040 0.0023 0.0061* 0.0041 0.0024 0.0061* 
 (0.0038) (0.0050) (0.0036) (0.0038) (0.0048) (0.0036) 
       
No. of observations 564 282 282 564 282 282 
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 Table A8: Robustness Check 3: Random- Effects Tobit Regressions with Group as Panel 
Identifier Types A and B 
Notes: All estimations are the result of random-effects Tobit Regressions that are left-censored at 0.1 and where 
group is the panel identifier. Round and Session dummies are included but not reported here. * denotes 
significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% 
level. 
 
  
Dependent Variable:  
EXERTED EFFORT 
(1)  
All  
Rounds 
(2)  
Rounds 
 1-3 
(3)  
Rounds  
4-6 
(4)  
All 
Rounds 
(5)  
Rounds  
1-3 
(6)  
Rounds  
4-6 
       
Constant -0.4010*** -0.6009*** -0.2177 -0.3458*** -0.4653*** -0.2337 
 (0.0969) (0.1265) (0.1430) (0.1047) (0.1361) (0.1548) 
       
A -0.0098 -0.0082 -0.0096 -0.1200 -0.2521** 0.0260 
 (0.0293) (0.0365) (0.0464) (0.0882) (0.1115) (0.1390) 
       
A*WAGE    0.0019 0.0041** -0.0006 
    (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0022) 
       
WAGE 0.0081*** 0.0085*** 0.0073*** 0.0072*** 0.0065*** 0.0076*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0017) 
       
DESIRED EFFORT 0.2297*** 0.2649** 0.2298** 0.2287*** 0.2630** 0.2305** 
 (0.0761) (0.1056) (0.1144) (0.0759) (0.1040) (0.1144) 
       
FEMALE -0.0509 0.0049 -0.1184** -0.0536* -0.0013 -0.1175** 
 (0.0317) (0.0400) (0.0500) (0.0317) (0.0395) (0.0501) 
       
NO. FRIENDS 0.0426** 0.0303 0.0587** 0.0417** 0.0290 0.0590** 
 (0.0185) (0.0231) (0.0295) (0.0185) (0.0227) (0.0295) 
       
AGE 0.0036 -0.0009 0.0092 0.0037 -0.0011 0.0092 
 (0.0036) (0.0044) (0.0057) (0.0036) (0.0043) (0.0057) 
       
RISK -0.0082 -0.0016 -0.0160 -0.0079 -0.0034 -0.0165 
 (0.0065) (0.0081) (0.0104) (0.0065) (0.0080) (0.0106) 
       
No. of observations 564 282 282 564 282 282 
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Table A9: Robustness Check 3: Random- Effects Tobit Regressions with Group as Panel 
Identifier Types B and C 
Notes: All estimations are the result of random-effects Tobit Regressions that are left-censored at 0.1 and where 
group is the panel identifier. Round and Session dummies are included but not reported here. * denotes 
significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% 
level. 
  
Dependent Variable:  
EXERTED EFFORT 
(1)  
All  
Rounds 
(2)  
Rounds 
 1-3 
(3)  
Rounds  
4-6 
(4)  
All 
Rounds 
(5)  
Rounds  
1-3 
(6)  
Rounds  
4-6 
       
Constant -0.3506*** -0.4641*** -0.2812** -0.4326*** -0.5849*** -0.3071** 
 (0.0978) (0.1418) (0.1312) (0.1072) (0.1524) (0.1467) 
       
B -0.0581** -0.0659* -0.0517 0.1012 0.1855 -0.0031 
 (0.0291) (0.0396) (0.0424) (0.0882) (0.1212) (0.1284) 
       
B*WAGE    -0.0027* -0.0042** -0.0008 
    (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0020) 
       
WAGE 0.0082*** 0.0086*** 0.0078*** 0.0095*** 0.0107*** 0.0082*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0016) 
       
DESIRED EFFORT 0.3230*** 0.3076*** 0.3469*** 0.3212*** 0.3050*** 0.3457*** 
 (0.0758) (0.1128) (0.1076) (0.0755) (0.1115) (0.1077) 
       
FEMALE -0.0433 -0.0108 -0.0772* -0.0452 -0.0145 -0.0776* 
 (0.0306) (0.0417) (0.0449) (0.0305) (0.0413) (0.0449) 
       
NO. FRIENDS 0.0520*** 0.0396 0.0663** 0.0514*** 0.0404 0.0657** 
 (0.0184) (0.0253) (0.0270) (0.0183) (0.0250) (0.0270) 
       
AGE 0.0056 0.0035 0.0081 0.0058* 0.0038 0.0082 
 (0.0035) (0.0047) (0.0051) (0.0034) (0.0047) (0.0051) 
       
RISK -0.0172*** -0.0111 -0.0231** -0.0161** -0.0109 -0.0224** 
 (0.0064) (0.0088) (0.0098) (0.0064) (0.0087) (0.0100) 
       
No. of observations 564 282 282 564 282 282 
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 Table A10: Robustness Check 4: Random- Effects GLS Regressions Types A and B 
Excluding Free-riding 
Notes: All estimations are the result of random-effects GLS Regressions with robust standard errors clustered at 
the subject level, where all observations with e=0.1 are excluded. Round and Session dummies are not included 
because otherwise there would be more variables to be estimated than clusters.  * denotes significance at the 
10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
  
Dependent Variable:  
EXERTED EFFORT 
(1)  
All  
Rounds 
(2)  
Rounds 
 1-3 
(3)  
Rounds  
4-6 
(4)  
All 
Rounds 
(5)  
Rounds  
1-3 
(6)  
Rounds  
4-6 
       
Constant -0.0247 -0.0810 0.1134 0.0488 0.0792 0.1474 
 (0.0820) (0.0772) (0.1317) (0.0878) (0.0954) (0.1358) 
       
A -0.0130 -0.0082 -0.0122 -0.1571 -0.2587*** -0.1028 
 (0.0281) (0.0306) (0.0352) (0.0980) (0.0902) (0.1503) 
       
A*WAGE    0.0023 0.0040*** 0.0015 
    (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0024) 
       
WAGE 0.0060*** 0.0063*** 0.0049*** 0.0048*** 0.0043*** 0.0042*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0015) 
       
DESIRED EFFORT 0.2486*** 0.2753*** 0.1965* 0.2420*** 0.2400*** 0.1987* 
 (0.0620) (0.0779) (0.1164) (0.0617) (0.0811) (0.1169) 
       
FEMALE -0.0518* -0.0306 -0.0835** -0.0527* -0.0325 -0.0842** 
 (0.0281) (0.0282) (0.0357) (0.0275) (0.0279) (0.0357) 
       
NO. FRIENDS 0.0396*** 0.0417** 0.0376** 0.0373** 0.0383** 0.0365** 
 (0.0151) (0.0185) (0.0165) (0.0149) (0.0183) (0.0165) 
       
AGE -0.0067 -0.0062 -0.0102 -0.0060 -0.0072 -0.0087 
 (0.0070) (0.0071) (0.0087) (0.0068) (0.0071) (0.0081) 
       
RISK 0.0066** 0.0048 0.0094*** 0.0063** 0.0040 0.0094*** 
 (0.0030) (0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0030) (0.0036) (0.0034) 
       
No. of observations 329 182 147 329 182 147 
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 Table A11: Robustness Check 4: Random- Effects GLS Regressions Types B and C 
Excluding Free-riding 
Notes: All estimations are the result of random-effects GLS Regressions with robust standard errors clustered at 
the subject level, where all observations with e=0.1 are excluded. Round and Session dummies are not included 
because otherwise there would be more variables to be estimated than clusters.  * denotes significance at the 
10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
  
Dependent Variable:  
EXERTED EFFORT 
(1)  
All  
Rounds 
(2)  
Rounds 
 1-3 
(3)  
Rounds  
4-6 
(4)  
All 
Rounds 
(5)  
Rounds  
1-3 
(6)  
Rounds  
4-6 
       
Constant 0.0328 0.1083 0.0431 0.0340 0.1220 0.0265 
 (0.0756) (0.0842) (0.1029) (0.0800) (0.1009) (0.1053) 
       
B -0.0168 -0.0507 0.0153 -0.0182 -0.0777 0.0459 
 (0.0288) (0.0310) (0.0373) (0.0879) (0.1129) (0.1323) 
       
B*WAGE    0.0000 0.0004 -0.0005 
    (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0020) 
       
WAGE 0.0048*** 0.0041*** 0.0043*** 0.0048*** 0.0039*** 0.0045*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0015) 
       
DESIRED EFFORT 0.2721*** 0.2745*** 0.2441*** 0.2719*** 0.2764*** 0.2457*** 
 (0.0642) (0.0798) (0.0937) (0.0642) (0.0816) (0.0928) 
       
FEMALE -0.0285 -0.0183 -0.0241 -0.0284 -0.0175 -0.0251 
 (0.0335) (0.0379) (0.0387) (0.0340) (0.0380) (0.0399) 
       
NO. FRIENDS 0.0153 0.0066 0.0189 0.0153 0.0065 0.0185 
 (0.0181) (0.0220) (0.0206) (0.0180) (0.0221) (0.0208) 
       
AGE -0.0039 -0.0047 -0.0030 -0.0040 -0.0049 -0.0027 
 (0.0074) (0.0080) (0.0085) (0.0073) (0.0080) (0.0084) 
       
RISK 0.0023 -0.0010 0.0050 0.0023 -0.0011 0.0050 
 (0.0037) (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0037) (0.0044) (0.0043) 
       
No. of observations 341 183 158 341 183 158 
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 Table A12: Robustness Check 5: Random- Effects Tobit Regressions Types A and B 
Excluding Groups Where Lower Wage Contract Chosen 
Notes: All estimations are the result of random-effects Tobit Regressions that are left-censored at 0.1 and where 
group is the panel identifier. All observations from groups where Type A chose the contract with the lower wage 
are eliminated. Round and Session dummies are included but not reported here. * denotes significance at the 
10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
  
Dependent Variable:  
EXERTED EFFORT 
(1)  
All  
Rounds 
(2)  
Rounds 
 1-3 
(3)  
Rounds  
4-6 
(4)  
All 
Rounds 
(5)  
Rounds  
1-3 
(6)  
Rounds  
4-6 
       
Constant -0.5200*** -0.6193*** -0.3086** -0.4340*** -0.4661*** -0.2474 
 (0.1331) (0.1461) (0.1568) (0.1362) (0.1520) (0.1625) 
       
A -0.0223 -0.0298 -0.0198 -0.2013** -0.2889*** -0.1740 
 (0.0571) (0.0542) (0.0662) (0.0908) (0.1081) (0.1261) 
       
A*WAGE    0.0029** 0.0042*** 0.0026 
    (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0018) 
       
WAGE 0.0090*** 0.0083*** 0.0097*** 0.0076*** 0.0062*** 0.0086*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0013) 
       
DESIRED EFFORT 0.2246*** 0.2743*** 0.1111 0.2247*** 0.2617*** 0.1066 
 (0.0588) (0.0949) (0.0820) (0.0586) (0.0929) (0.0815) 
       
FEMALE -0.0601 0.0071 -0.1062 -0.0648 0.0037 -0.1114 
 (0.0620) (0.0593) (0.0716) (0.0617) (0.0582) (0.0724) 
       
NO. FRIENDS 0.0507 0.0340 0.0606 0.0496 0.0336 0.0596 
 (0.0361) (0.0338) (0.0419) (0.0360) (0.0331) (0.0422) 
       
AGE -0.0078 0.0003 -0.0163 -0.0074 -0.0020 -0.0144 
 (0.0128) (0.0122) (0.0148) (0.0128) (0.0120) (0.0150) 
       
RISK 0.0031 -0.0016 0.0067 0.0031 -0.0018 0.0069 
 (0.0070) (0.0066) (0.0081) (0.0070) (0.0064) (0.0082) 
       
No. of observations 528 254 274 528 254 274 
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Table A13: Robustness Check 5: Random- Effects Tobit Regressions Types B and C 
Excluding Groups Where Lower Wage Contract Chosen 
Notes: All estimations are the result of random-effects Tobit Regressions that are left-censored at 0.1 and where 
group is the panel identifier. All observations from groups where Type A chose the contract with the lower wage 
are eliminated. Round and Session dummies are included but not reported here. * denotes significance at the 
10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
  
Dependent Variable:  
EXERTED EFFORT 
(1)  
All  
Rounds 
(2)  
Rounds 
 1-3 
(3)  
Rounds  
4-6 
(4)  
All 
Rounds 
(5)  
Rounds  
1-3 
(6)  
Rounds  
4-6 
       
Constant -0.3142** -0.3634** -0.2326 -0.3675*** -0.4754*** -0.2412 
 (0.1275) (0.1572) (0.1444) (0.1329) (0.1651) (0.1552) 
       
B -0.0534 -0.0461 -0.0544 0.0477 0.1724 -0.0382 
 (0.0528) (0.0561) (0.0578) (0.0913) (0.1185) (0.1219) 
       
B*WAGE    -0.0016 -0.0036** -0.0003 
    (0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0018) 
       
WAGE 0.0083*** 0.0081*** 0.0080*** 0.0092*** 0.0100*** 0.0081*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
       
DESIRED EFFORT 0.2344*** 0.2136** 0.2461*** 0.2355*** 0.2143** 0.2461*** 
 (0.0644) (0.0999) (0.0894) (0.0644) (0.0995) (0.0894) 
       
FEMALE -0.0336 0.0172 -0.0704 -0.0347 0.0141 -0.0706 
 (0.0554) (0.0587) (0.0607) (0.0549) (0.0574) (0.0607) 
       
NO. FRIENDS 0.0584* 0.0334 0.0697* 0.0581* 0.0355 0.0696* 
 (0.0333) (0.0350) (0.0366) (0.0330) (0.0343) (0.0366) 
       
AGE -0.0193 -0.0080 -0.0258** -0.0186 -0.0081 -0.0256** 
 (0.0117) (0.0125) (0.0129) (0.0116) (0.0122) (0.0129) 
       
RISK 0.0056 0.0011 0.0074 0.0057 0.0015 0.0074 
 (0.0063) (0.0066) (0.0069) (0.0062) (0.0065) (0.0069) 
       
No. of observations 528 254 274 528 254 274 
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Appendix 2: Instructions 
          
General Information 
Thank you for being part of our research. You will be taking part in a study of labor markets. 
If you read these instructions carefully, you may earn a significant sum of money. 
During the experiment your income will be calculated in Coupons. After the experiment 
Coupons will be exchanged into Euros according to the following exchange rate: 
 
4 Coupons = 1 € 
 
In addition you will receive a show-up fee of 2.50 €. You will be paid confidentially and in 
cash right after the experiment. If you have any question just raise your hand and we will 
come to help you. 
 
Procedure 
 
Each of you will be randomly assigned to one of two groups: “managers” and “employees.” 
If you are an employee you will be assigned to one of the three employee types A, B or C. 
Which group and type you belong to is shown on the display. Each participant knows his or 
her role and type. They will not be changed during the experiment. 
 
The experiment consists of several market periods. In each stage, one manager will be 
randomly assigned to one employee of each type. That means each manager will face three 
employees of the types A, B and C. The assignment will be anonymous, allowing no one to 
know at any point which other participants he or she is assigned to. 
Each market period will have three stages as follows: 
In stage 1 every manager will design two work contracts. Each consists of the following 
elements: 
• A fixed wage the manager has to pay the employee. The minimum wage is 20 
Coupons, the maximum wage is 120 Coupons. 
 
• A desired effort level for the employee. The desired effort level can be every number 
between 0.1 and 1.0. 
 
In stage 2 the valid work contract for the employees will be chosen. This happens as follows: 
• The type A employee has the opportunity to pick one of the two contracts. The chosen 
contract will also be valid for the other employees of type B and C. 
• The type B employee will be informed about both contracts offered and the decision 
of type A.  
• The type C employee will be informed about the decision of type A only. 
This procedure and the assigned type remain the same for each employee and will not be 
changed during the experiment. 
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In stage 3 every employee can react to the valid contract by choosing his or her actual effort 
level that does not have to correspond with the desired effort level. The actual effort level can 
also be every number between 0.1 and 1.0.  
The income of a manager in every market period depends on the fixed wage paid and the 
actual effort level. The income of an employee in every market period matches the fixed 
wage paid minus the costs for the chosen effort level. You will find the detailed procedure for 
calculating the income of managers and employees below. 
Important: Your payoff 
After the last period, one market period is randomly determined for every manager and 
employee. The income in this round combined with the 2.50€ show-up fee is your payoff 
and will be paid to you after the experiment in cash. Remember to decide carefully in 
each market period, for each period could be relevant for your payoff. Please note too 
that the income of a manager results from his work contract with one employee (either 
of type A or type B or type C) 
 
How do Employees Calculate their Income? 
In each period, one work contract is valid for every employee consisting of a fixed wage 
and the desired effort level. To determine the final income of each period, the costs for 
the actual effort level and fixed costs of 20 Coupons have to be subtracted from the fixed 
wage. 
The costs for the actual effort level are determined as follows: 
1. An employee determines his or her quantity of work by choosing a number 
between 0.1 and 1.0 from the schedule below. The lowest amount of work he or 
she can choose is 0.1: 0.2 is a slightly higher amount, and so on up to 1.0, the 
highest amount. 
2. The higher the quantity of work an employee chooses, the better it is for the 
manager. That is, the higher the number an employee chooses the higher the 
manager’s income. The exact calculation of the manager’s income is described in 
detail on the next page.  
3. The higher the amount of work an employee chooses, the higher his work-
related costs. You can find out how these costs are related to quantity of work by 
looking at the schedule below. 
 
 
 37 
The income of an employee (in Coupons) is calculated using the following formula: 
 
Income of an employee (in Coupons)  =      fixed wage    
                     – costs for actual effort level  
                  – fixed costs (20 Coupons) 
 
 
How do Managers Calculate their Income? 
1. In each period a manager is endowed with 120 Coupons per employee which he 
may use to pay the fixed wage for an employee. The manager may choose every 
fixed wage between 20 and 120 Coupons. If he makes an offer of 80 Coupons he 
will have 40 Coupons left. If he makes an offer of 20 Coupons he will have 100 
Coupons left. The selection of a given fixed wage therefore leads to the respective 
number of Coupons remaining for the manager:  
 
Coupons remaining = 120 Coupons – fixed wage 
 
2. The remaining Coupons are transformed into income through the following 
procedure: The remaining Coupons are multiplied by the exerted effort level of the 
employee. The result is the income of the manager in Coupons. This means: 
 
Income of the manager (in Coupons) = Remaining Coupons * Exerted effort level 
 
Note:  
The income for all managers and employees is calculated following the same rules. Every 
manager receives 120 Coupons per period and employee. The work related costs and the 
fixed costs are the same for each employee. Every manager is able to calculate the income 
of their own employee and each employee is able to calculate the income of their own 
manager.                              
Exerted effort 
level 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
Costs 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
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Instructions on the computer screen 
[Instructions differing for the different groups are marked with [].] 
For the course of the entire experiment you are assigned the role of [A, B, C: an employee of 
type ] [M: a manager]. In each period you are [A, B, C: randomly assigned a different 
manager] [M: randomly assigned three employees of type A, B and C.] 
[A: Please wait until the manager has specified the two alternative contracts.]  
[B: Please wait until the manager has specified the two alternative contracts and the type A 
employee has chosen one.]  
[C: Please wait until the final contract is determined.] 
[M: In stage 1 of each period you can specify two work contracts each consisting of a fixed 
wage and a desired effort level. Note that the fixed wage and desired effort level each need 
to be different for each contract! 
In stage 2 of each period, the type A and type B employees are informed about the two 
alternative contracts. The type A employee then decides upon one of the two contracts that 
will be valid for all three employees. In stage 3 of each period all employees decide upon 
their actual effort level] 
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and we will come to help you. If you have 
understood the instructions, please confirm by pressing the red OK-Button. 
 
 
The labor market is now open. We are in period {t}. 
[M: Stage 1: Designing the work contracts 
Please specify the first of the two work contracts by selecting a fixed wage between 20 and 
120 and a desired effort level between 0.1 and 1.0: 
Work contract: 
• Fixed wage of: {w1, whole number >=20, <=120} 
• Desired effort level: {E1, number of table 1} 
 
Please confirm you decision by pressing the red OK-Button. 
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Please specify another work contract by selecting a fixed wage between 20 and 120 and a 
desired effort level between 0.1 and 1.0. Note that the two contracts need to differ in both 
fixed wage and desired effort level. 
Alternative work contract: 
• Fixed wage of: {w2, whole number >=20, <=120 �  w1} 
• Desired effort level: {E2, number of table 1 �  E1} 
Right after you have again confirmed your decision with the red Button, stage 1 is finished. 
Please wait until all employees have finished their parts.] 
[A: Your manager has specified the following two alternative contracts for you to choose:]  
[B: In this period the manager has specified the following two work contracts from which 
type A employee is now choosing:]  
[A, B: 
• Fixed wage of: {w1}, desired effort level: {E1}, 
• Fixed wage of: {w2}, desired effort level: {E2}.] 
[A: Please choose one of the two contracts by selecting the desired contract. Your decision is 
also valid for the type B and type C employees.]  
[B: Which contract would you choose?]  
 
[A, B: 
] 
[A: You chose the following work contract:]  
[B, C: The type A employee chose the following work contract that is also valid for you:] 
 
[A, B, C: 
• Fixed wage of {wi}, desired effort level {Ei}. 
Your choice: {vi} [B: {vib}]  
Alternative contracts: Fixed wage: {w1} 
Desired effort level: {E1} 
Fixed wage: {w2} 
Desired effort level: {E2} 
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Please choose your corresponding actual effort level and select your choice from the 
following table:  
 
Please confirm your decision by pressing the red OK-Button.]  
 
[A: You chose the following work contract:]  
[B, C: The following work contract was selected:] 
 
[A, B, C: 
• Fixed wage of {wi}, desired effort level {Ei}, 
and you decided for an actual effort level of [A: {ea}] [B: {eb}] [C: {ec}] 
 
Your income in this period is therefore calculated as follows: 
• [A: {cna}] [B: {cnb}] [C: {cnc}] Coupons, that are [A: {ea}] [B: {eb}] [C: {ec}] 
Euros. 
• Your manager receives: [A: {cga}] [B: {cgb}] [C: {cgc}] Coupons, that are [A: 
{ega}] [B: {egb}] [C: {egc}] Euros.] 
 
[M: Your income in period {t} 
In stage 1 you specified the following two contracts: 
• Work contract 1:  fixed wage {w1}, desired effort level {E1} 
• Work contract 2:  fixed wage {w2}, desired effort level {E2} 
In stage 2 the type A employee chose work contract {vi} that is therefore valid for all 
employees. The following actual effort levels were chosen: 
Your choice           
Exerted effort 
level 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
COSTS 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
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• Employee A: {ea} 
• Employee B: {eb} 
• Employee C: {ec} 
You income from the work relation with the employees in this period is therefore: 
 Of the contract with Employee A:  
o {cga} Coupons, that are {ega} Euros. 
o Employee A receives: {cna} Coupons, that are {ena} Euros. 
 Of the contract with Employee B:  
o {cgb} Coupons, that are {egb} Euros. 
o Employee B receives: {cnb} Coupons, that are {enb} Euros. 
 Of the contract with Employee C:  
o {cgc} Coupons, that are {egc} Euros. 
o Employee B receives: {cnc} Coupons, that are {enc} Euros.] 
 
Note: At the end of the experiment one period [M: and one work relation] is randomly 
selected. Your income in this particular period will be paid to you in cash. 
Right after you pressed the red OK-Button the next period of the labor market begins and [A, 
B, C: you will again be randomly assigned a manager] [M: you will again be randomly 
assigned employees of types A, B and C]. 
Please wait until the next period of the labor market is open. 
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3. Post-experimental Questionnaire 
 
The following questions were rated on a 7-point scale (1=completely disagree; 
7=completely agree) 
 
[Worker Type A, B, C:] 
 
 I consider the procedure that determined my work contract fair. 
 My work contract was justified. 
 The contract setting procedure was comprehensible. 
 I am satisfied with my work contract. 
 I had no influence on the final work contract. 
 
[Manager:] 
 
 The proposed work contracts were fair.  
 The contract setting procedure was comprehensible. 
 Employees will be satisfied with their work contracts. 
 Employees had no influence on the final work contract. 
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